Collateral By Algorithm: When The Model Makes The Mistake
From Project Maven to disputed targeting reports, trace where algorithmic assistance enters military decisions. The central questions concern human judgment, accountability and what the evidence can establish about civilian harm.
Opening Brief
Algorithmic decision support can affect military operations, but responsibility, targeting authority and civilian-harm outcomes remain system- and operation-specific.
Evidence Standard
Every registered proposition below is tied to one named record. A policy, study or institutional statement is used only for the proposition it directly supports.
What the Record Establishes
The cited records establish specific mandates, policies, studies and dated events. They support bounded findings rather than a complete hidden-system narrative.
What the Record Does Not Establish
The public record does not establish inevitability, total automation, universal control or one coordinating authority across every system described.
From Project Maven To Decision Support
The US military’s first large programme to apply machine learning to targeting data was Project Maven, formally the Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Team, created by a memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work on 26 April 2017. Its stated job was to flag objects, classify threats and highlight anomalies in full-motion drone video so that human analysts could work faster.
The programme became public in March 2018 when reporting revealed Google engineers were helping build the computer-vision models. More than three thousand employees signed a petition against the work, and in June 2018 Google said it would not renew the contract. Palantir later developed the Maven Smart System, and responsibility for the programme was divided between the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and the Chief Digital and AI Office in 2022.
What US Policy Requires
Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, reissued on 25 January 2023 and replacing the 2012 version, governs autonomy in weapon systems. It requires that such systems be designed so commanders and operators can exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force, that they pass senior review, and that they undergo verification, validation and realistic testing. It also calls for technologies and data that are transparent, auditable and explainable.
The directive does not prohibit autonomous weapons, and it does not require a human to approve every engagement. It sets a review and testing standard. The department’s August 2022 Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan adds a separate set of commitments to assess and reduce civilian harm.
The Gaza Targeting Reports And The Dispute
The most contested public allegations come from April 2024 reporting by +972 Magazine and Local Call. They described a system called Lavender that reportedly flagged about 37,000 Palestinians as suspected militants, and another called Gospel that recommended buildings as targets, with sources claiming human review was sometimes brief.
The Israel Defense Forces rejected that account. It said it does not use an artificial intelligence system that identifies terrorist operatives or predicts whether a person is a terrorist, and described the tool as a database for cross-referencing intelligence, with information systems acting as tools for analysts. United Nations human rights experts also raised concern in April 2024 about the reported use of AI in Gaza. The claims rest largely on anonymous sources and the IDF’s denial, and no independent audit of the systems or their error rates has been published.
The International Response
On 22 December 2023 the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 78/241 on lethal autonomous weapons systems by 152 votes to 4, with 11 abstentions. It acknowledged serious challenges and concerns raised by new technologies in the military domain, including artificial intelligence and autonomy in weapons. The resolution is not binding and does not create a treaty, and the International Committee of the Red Cross has separately called for limits on autonomous weapon systems.
Where The Evidence Stops
The record establishes that algorithmic tools support military targeting, that US policy sets testing and human-judgment requirements, and that serious allegations about their use exist. It does not establish how much any specific system influenced any specific strike, or that civilian harm followed from an algorithm instead of from human decisions, intelligence errors or the conduct of the conflict.
What would change this verdict: declassified or independently audited targeting records, error-rate data, and after-action investigations that attribute particular civilian harm to algorithmic outputs. Those records have not been published.
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Evidence Ledger
Registered claims and their evidential status
The Department of Defense publishes an action plan for civilian-harm mitigation and response.
The directive establishes policy and review requirements for autonomous weapon systems.
ICRC recommends limits and prohibitions from a humanitarian perspective.
GAO reviews Department of Defense development and acquisition of AI capabilities for weapon systems.
Final Assessment
Read each finding at the scale of its source. An institutional record can establish a published mandate, rule, programme or assessment; it cannot prove every implementation, downstream effect or unstated intention. Context sources explain why a question matters, while primary records carry the registered factual claims. Where the evidence stops, the classification stays contested or unresolved. That boundary is deliberate: it preserves the strongest supported conclusion without converting an analytical possibility into a documented fact.
The public record shows that military institutions recognise civilian-harm risk and have created policies for mitigation, review and response. It also shows that autonomous weapon systems and AI-enabled capabilities are moving through formal acquisition and governance processes. Those facts matter, but policy existence is not evidence that every operational model is accurate, explainable or insulated from pressure.
Accountability cannot stop at whether a human remained nominally in the loop. A credible system must preserve targeting assumptions, model limits, operator decisions, post-strike evidence and a route to remedy when civilians are harmed. The present evidence supports concern about responsibility gaps; it does not support claiming that an algorithm independently selects and kills without institutional control in every case. The unresolved issue is whether review systems can keep pace with deployment.
Sources
Primary, institutional and independent source trail
- 01DOD2022Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action PlanDepartment Policy
- 02DOD2023Directive 3000.09 Autonomous Weapon SystemsDepartment Directive
- 03ICRC2021ICRC position on autonomous weapon systemsHumanitarian Position
- 04GAO2022Artificial Intelligence: Status of Developing and Acquiring Capabilities for Weapon SystemsFederal Oversight
- 05UN782023UN General Assembly resolution 78/241UN Resolution
- 069722024Lavender: the AI machine directing Israel’s bombing spree in GazaInvestigative Reporting
- 07OHCHR2024UN experts on the reported use of AI in GazaUN Press Release
- 08CSIS2025What is Maven Smart System, and what does it do?Think-Tank Analysis
Continue the Chain
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